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OrHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS
EVIDENCE IN MISSISSIPPI COURTS
Robert M. Ryan*
Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Mississippi RULES OF EVIDENCE are tailor-made for
bringing out the best from the participants in our state adversarial system. This
Article is intended to focus on the introduction or exclusion of evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts on the part of a criminal defendant and/or third persons
at the trial level. At the outset, it will be accepted as true that any offered evi-
dence is relevant to the material issues of the proceeding, thus keeping within the
provisions of Rules 401 and 402 of the Mississippi RULES OF EVIDENCE. The rel-
evance of the intended evidence, therefore, will not be a consideration for pur-
poses of this discussion.
Because they are patterned after the corresponding provisions of the FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE, examination of Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Mississippi
RULES OF EVIDENCE will be discussed in conjunction with a meaningful consider-
ation of significant and relevant federal case law as well as Mississippi case law.'
Hopefully, by so doing, a fuller and more comprehensive look at the generally
accepted interpretations and uses of Rules 403 and 404(b) will serve as a helpful
aid in understanding and applying the intended tenor and spirit of the rules in
Mississippi courts.
I. RULE 403, MississiPpi RULES OF EVIDENCE
In plain, simple terms, Rule 403 of the Mississippi RULES OF EVIDENCE general-
ly provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence on the grounds that it would be
unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or a waste of time. Rule 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence
It is readily apparent that the very wording of the rule incorporates a subjective
and discretionary approach to any effective resolution of trial objections to the
introduction or exclusion of other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence. It should be
equally obvious, in the criminal context, that prosecutors would not attempt to
introduce evidence unless the effect was to prejudice a criminal defendant.
Likewise, defense attorneys understandably strive to have prejudicial evidence
excluded, primarily because its introduction would have a strong tendency to
make their clients look bad. Enter the trial judge, whose duty it is to correctly
*Assistant Public Defender in the Office of the Hinds County Public Defender, Jackson, Mississippi.
1. THE Mississippi RuLEs OF EVIDENCE were adopted effective January 1, 1986. Mississippi has continu-
ously followed existing federal and state practice. United States v. Renfro, 620 E2d 497 (5th Cir. 1980); May v.
State, 524 So. 2d 957, 965 (Miss. 1988).
2. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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examine the proffered evidence, perform the required weighing and balancing of
probative value versus prejudicial effect, and rule on admissibility of any such
offered evidence.
Rule 403 of the MississiPpi RULES OF EVIDENCE has been clearly defined as the
ultimate filter through which all relevant evidence must pass prior to its being
accepted under one of the exceptions listed in Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi
RULES OF EVIDENCE. 3 Evidence has probative value if it tends to prove an issue.'
Additionally, from the civil side, we learn from Mississippi Power and Light Co.
v. Lumpkin' the following, as concerns the proposition of offered evidence "sub-
stantially outweighing" its probative value:
It is important for the courts to remember, however, that potential prejudice is
not equally weighted with probative value under this test. In Foster v. State, 508
So. 2d 1111 (Miss. 1987), this Court held:
[A] trial court presented with a Rule 403 objection to relevant evidence must
engage in a balancing process. The more probative the evidence is, the less like-
ly it is that a 403 factor will be of sufficient consequence to substantially out-
weigh the probative value ....
If one or more of the 403 considerations slightly outweigh[s] probative value,
the evidence still must be admitted. To tip the scale is not enough. The 403 fac-
tors must, in the language of the rule, "substantially outweigh" probative value
before the evidence may be excluded. Foster, 508 So. 2d at 1117. We note that
where the trial court makes specific findings on the record concerning its deter-
minations under Rule 403, proper review is facilitated.6
Armed with a basic understanding of the provisions of Rule 403, we next must
examine its companion rule, 404(b).
II. RULE 404(b), Mississippi RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi RULES OF EVIDENCE provides us with the second
aspect of any discussion concerning other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence.
Rule 404(b) must be considered in conjunction with its counterpart, Rule 403,
prior to any final determination by a trial court that any offered evidence can be
admitted and considered by a trial jury. Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part,
the:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted
3. Bounds v. State, 688 So. 2d 1362, 1370 (Miss. 1997); Smith v. State, 656 So. 2d 95, 99 (Miss. 1995);
Watts v. State, 635 So. 2d 1364, 1368 (Miss. 1994); Ford v. State, 555 So. 2d 691, 693 (Miss. 1989); Jenkins v.
State, 507 So. 2d 89, 93 (Miss. 1987).
4. Noe v. State, 616 So. 2d 298, 304 (Miss. 1993); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
5. 725 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 1998).
6. Id.
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in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
7
At this point in the discussion, we know a few very important facts concerning
the use of other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence at the trial phase. To be consid-
ered for admittance, the evidence must pass the Rule 403 test. Essentially, the
relevant evidence must have probative value, and not be outweighed by any
unfair prejudicial effect that it may possess. If the subject evidence successfully
passes the Rule 403 weighing and balancing test, it qualifies for admittance pro-
vided, however, that the evidence is offered to prove one or more of the listed
exceptions as set forth in Rule 404(b). Merely passing a Rule 403 analysis does
not automatically qualify the evidence for admission into evidence.
The best way to acquire a better understanding of the workings and interplay of
Rules 403 and 404(b) is to examine a few of the more significant Mississippi
Supreme Court cases dealing with the subject matter. Further, consideration of
some relevant federal cases should assist in gaining better insight as to exactly
how the adversarial participants should present their respective positions con-
cerning the exclusion or admittance of other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence in
the courtroom. Additionally, the examination will present the responsibilities
placed on trial judges when confronted with Rules 403 and 404(b) issues.
III. THE APPLICATION OF RULES 403 AND 404(b) IN THE COURTROOM
One of the first major cases dealing with a Rule 403 and 404(b) issue on
appeal from a trial court, following the adoption of the Mississippi RULES OF
EVIDENCE, is the case of Jenkins v. State.8 Jenkins was tried for the attempted
kidnapping of a store patron in conjunction with the foiled attempt to rob a gro-
cery store.' Over defense objection, the prosecution was permitted to introduce
evidence of Jenkins' plan to rob the business.1" The evidence was received to
show motive, opportunity, or intent pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the MississiPPI
RULES OF EVIDENCE. 1"
Following a discussion of Rules 401 and 402 of the MIssIssIPPI RULES OF
EVIDENCE, the court applied a superficial analysis of Rule 403 while acknowl-
edging that, although technically relevant, the evidence had a great prejudicial
effect. 2 The court stated that allowing the evidence would "arguably inject col-
lateral issues into the case." 3
7. FED. R. EvIn. 404(b) (emphasis added).
8. 507 So. 2d 89 (Miss. 1987).
9. Id. at 90.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 92. (The threshold question was whether the offered evidence in controversy had a tendency to
make the existence of a fact that was a consequence to the determination of whether it made Jenkins' guilt more
probable or less probable than it would have been without the evidence. The court stated that such questions
must be answered in the context of the elements of the offense and the prosecution's theory of how the crime
was alleged to have been committed).
13. Id.
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The court ruled the following:
Our inquiry is not ended. Evidence not admissible because prejudicial under
Rule 403 may nevertheless be received if it qualifies under Rule 404(b) ....
As such it may become admissible though otherwise excludable under a com-
bined reading of Rules 401-403. In other words, if the evidence . . . satisfies
one of the Rule 404(b) exceptions, that is, if it be such that it satisfies some
other evidentiary purpose beyond simply showing that Jenkins is the sort of fel-
low likely to commit the crime charged, it may be admissible notwithstanding
that the evidence would otherwise be excludable under Rule 403 ...
To be sure, evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) is also subject to the preju-
dice test of Rule 403; that is, even though the Circuit Court considered the evi-
dence at issue admissible under Rule 404(b), it was still required by Rule 403 to
consider whether its probative value on the issues of motive, opportunity and
intent was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In this
sense Rule 403 is an ultimate filter through which all otherwise admissible evi-
dence must pass.14
The holding in Jenkins may be somewhat confusing because on one hand, it
would appear that evidence found to be prejudicial under Rule 403 may be
received if it qualifies as an exception under Rule 404(b). On the other hand, the
court held that, although qualifying under Rule 404(b), the evidence must satisfy
Rule 403 requirements as determined by weighing and balancing the probative
value of the evidence versus any prejudicial effect.
In any event, en route to affirming the admittance of the other crimes, wrongs,
or acts evidence, the Jenkins Court clearly pronounced the rule that the prosecu-
tion may not present evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence to the
jury unless the evidence is substantially relevant for some purpose other than to
show a probability that the defendant committed the crime charged because he
had displayed criminal propensities in the past."
The holding in Jenkins was applied in several cases leading up to the case of
Ford v. State.16 At this point in the discussion, Ford is an interesting case to con-
sider. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Ford's grand larceny conviction,
and held that testimony of a bank teller from another bank that the defendant had
allegedly robbed the next day using an identical modus operandi, was admissible
for the limited purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 7
14. Id. at 92-93.
15. The "other purposes" are listed and codified in Mississippi RuLEs OF EVIDENCE, 404(b).
16. 555 So. 2d 691 (Miss. 1989). See also Darby v. State, 538 So. 2d 1168 (Miss. 1989); Haynes v. State,
520 So. 2d 1367 (Miss. 1988); May v. State, 524 So. 2d 957 (Miss. 1988); Wheeler v. State, 536 So. 2d 1347
(Miss. 1988); Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1317 (Miss. 1987).
17. Ford, 555 So. 2d at 692-98.
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Admittedly, prior to the Ford decision, this writer was under the mistaken
belief that other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence referred to prior bad acts on the
part of a defendant. Ford tells us two important things concerning bad acts evi-
dence. One, subsequent other crimes, wrongs, or acts may likewise be admissi-
ble, and two, upon the allowance of any such evidence, a cautionary or limiting
jury instruction is required in order to ensure that the trial jury is properly
instructed as to how to use any such evidence."8 Although the limiting instruc-
tion in the Ford case, including all of the Rule 404(b) exceptions, appears to have
the approval of the Mississippi Supreme Court, later cases expand on the proper
procedures to be used when considering the propriety of cautionary jury instruc-
tions when trial courts allow bad acts evidence. Ford should not be read to mean
that prosecutors are carte blanche entitled to a shotgun instruction setting forth
every Rule 404(b) exception simply because a trial judge has found such evi-
dence to be more probative than prejudicial under a Rule 403 analysis. As we
will see, the prosecution is required to inform a trial court of the specific pur-
pose, or Rule 404(b) exception, for which admission is sought.
The case of Hogan v. State"s presents an interesting twist on the subject of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence. Rose Marie Hogan was indicted and
convicted on six counts of aggravated assault, and the Mississippi Supreme
Court affirmed her convictions.2" The facts of the Hogan case are interesting in
that the bad acts evidence admitted at trial consisted of the acts of others." This
evidence, however, was offered by the state to prove motive under Rule 404(b).22
Hogan's husband had been beaten and robbed during the course of a drug
transaction at a nightclub in Vicksburg, Mississippi.23 Upon learning of the beat-
ing and robbery, Hogan immediately proceeded to the nightclub, attempting to
retrieve the money that had been stolen from Danny, her husband.2" On her
arrival, Hogan fired several shots into a group of people outside the nightclub
and injured several of them.2" At trial, the state attorney offered evidence of the
incident, and following an analysis pursuant to Rule 403, the trial judge allowed
the testimony finding that the same was material to prove Hogan's motive for the
18. The Ford jury was charged with the following instruction:
The court instructs the jury that the testimony of Gloria Carter regarding an alleged incident at the
First National Bank in West Memphis, Arkansas, was offered in an effort to prove motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, regarding this
Defendant, John Wiley Ford. You may give this testimony such weight and credibility as you deem
proper under the circumstances. However, you cannot and must not consider this testimony in any
way regarding whether this Defendant is guilty or not guilty of the charges for which he is presently
on trial.
Id. at 695-96.
19. 580 So. 2d 1275 (Miss. 1991).
20. Id. at 1279.
21. Id. at 1277-78.
22. Id. at 1277.
23. Id. at 1276.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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shooting. The allowance of bad acts evidence on the part of others in Hogan was
found to be within the discretion of the trial court and not suggestive, in any way,
that Hogan had been involved in a drug transaction, or that she was unduly preju-
diced by the admittance of the evidence."
A. Watts v. State
The case of Watts v. State27 is of major significance to any discussion concern-
ing the state of Rules 403 and 404(b). Watts is probably cited and relied upon
more than any other single decision in cases involving Rule 403 and 404(b) evi-
dentiary issues. Watts is truly a landmark decision in Mississippi jurisprudence
and, in view of the cases following, has become one of major significance in the
area of other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence in Mississippi trial court practice.
Watts was convicted of attempted business burglary and sentenced to a maxi-
mum term of seven years.28 The case was overturned because of the trial court's
erroneous admission of other crimes evidence.29 In reversing, the court acknowl-
edged several problems associated with the allowance of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts evidence, and expressed a serious concern over an incomplete record
showing a justifiable basis for the trial judge's decision. Addressing the issue,
the court stated:
Returning to the instant case, the trial court apparently found the testimony of
Watts' alleged previous burglary admissible, though it is not clear on what basis.
Even with a finding of admissibility under Rule 404(b), however, it remains
clear that the required balancing test of Rule 403 was never conducted. We
again arrive full circle at the possibility that the jury improperly inferred that
Watts committed the crime for which he is on trial because he is a person who
has displayed criminal propensities in the past...
In addition to the fact that no test of prejudicial effect versus probative value
was conducted, there is also the fact that the "other crime" testimony was given
free of any limiting instruction ....
26. Id. at 1278. See also Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1996) (holding that evidence of affiliation
or membership with a street gang was admissible under Rules 403 and 404(b) to show motive and the probative
value of the evidence outweighed any unfair prejudice to the defendant). But see Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S.
159 (1992) (holding that it was constitutional error to admit stipulation of defendant's membership in white
racist prison gang where the evidence was not relevant to any issue being decided at the punishment phase);
Parker v. State, 606 So. 2d 1132 (Miss. 1992) (allowing testimony that the defendant had requested a ride to an
area near where the victim's body was found to retrieve a package of marijuana previously hidden was error,
but was not found to be prejudicial to the extent that a reversal was warranted). Compare Day v. State, 589 So.
2d 637 (Miss. 1991) (holding that evidence of prior threats made by the victim of a homicide to the defendant
was admissible in a murder trial on the issue of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing), with
Rose v. State, 556 So. 2d 728 (Miss. 1990) (finding the admission of unrelated crimes was reversible error).
27. 635 So. 2d 1364 (Miss. 1994).
28. Id. at 1366.
29. Id. at 1369.
30. Id. The court rejected the state's argument that the other crimes testimony was necessary to establish
Watts' intent and/or necessary for the telling of a complete, rational story of the events in question. The court
found that under the facts of the case, neither the rules of evidence nor the case law supported admission of the
other crimes testimony.
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We find no indication that a proper limiting instruction was submitted to the
jury in the case sub judice, making it all the more likely that the testimony of
another possible crime was considered for impermissible purposes, i.e. to imply
that on this particular occasion, Watts was acting in conformity with his estab-
lished character. We must conclude that the multiple problems associated with
the admission of the testimony of evidence of another crime at Watts' trial con-
stitutes reversible error. Further, while recognizing the need to be thorough, we
would point out in hindsight that there appeared to be sufficient evidence to
support Watts' conviction without the need to resort to evidence of Watts' con-
nection to another unrelated crime. In a case where sufficient evidence is pre-
sented on each essential element of the crime, and a conviction is seemingly
assured, the prosecution might do well to follow the old adage that "more is not
always better" rather than risk upsetting the conviction by seeking to introduce
inadmissible, and unnecessary evidence.31
The impact of Watts, concerning other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence, is pri-
marily threefold. First, the court has clearly mandated that trial judges must
accomplish the required weighing and balancing of prejudicial effect versus the
probative value of such evidence, and any analysis must include, on the record,
findings supporting a decision that allows introduction of the evidence. Second,
if the trial court finds that the proffered evidence satisfies the requirements of
Rules 404(b) and 403, the trial jury must be charged with a limiting/cautionary
instruction to ensure that the evidence is not used for impermissible purposes.
An impermissible purpose would be, for example, an inference that the accused
acted in conformity with his past bad acts. The language of Watts appears to
suggest that a failure to grant a limiting instruction in such instances could never
be harmless error. Lastly, and most importantly, it is this writer's opinion that
offered evidence, if it is unnecessary, should not be admitted notwithstanding
that it may otherwise satisfy the provisions of Rules 403 and 404(b). Stated
another way, if the government has other methods of proving a 404(b) exception
upon which reliance has been placed, the offered evidence should not be admit-
ted. 2 This feature of Watts is extremely important, and should be of concern to
trial judges and the defense attorneys confronted with situations whereby evi-
dence is sought to be admitted under provisions of Rules 403 and 404(b) that can
or has been shown by other means.
The post- Watts case of Mack v. State33 dealt with, among other issues, the intro-
duction of evidence of Mack's other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence. The trial
court allowed the prosecutor to present evidence that Mack had purchased and
smoked cocaine on the evening of the robbery-murder for which he was tried.
34
31. Id. at 1368-69 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 1369. Note: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for purposes such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Mississippi RutES OF EVIDENCE 404(b).
33. 650 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1994).
34. Id. at 1311.
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Mack argued that the underlying felony of robbery, if established, would have
been adequate to explain his motive for the murder, thus making the cocaine
related testimony unnecessary. 5 The court rejected Mack's argument but did
acknowledge some correctness in his proposition. The court held:
Mack is correct as far as that goes. However, this Court in West pointed out
that there are some exceptions to the general rule. The West [C]ourt stated:
There are certain recognized exceptions to the rule. Proof of another crime is
admissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so con-
nected as to constitute one transaction, where it is necessary to identify the
defendant, where it is material to prove motive and there is an apparent relation
or connection between the act proposed to be proved and that charged, where the
accusation involves a series of criminal acts which must be proved to make out
the offense, or where it is necessary to prove scienter or guilty knowledge."
If evidence that a defendant has committed a crime or other bad acts falls within
a 404(b) exception, before admitting evidence of the crime or act, the trial judge
must weigh the probativeness of the evidence against the prejudicial effect under
Rule 403. In Ford, the Court stated:
To be sure, evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) is also subject to the prejudi-
cial test of Rule 403: that is, even though the Circuit Court considered the evi-
dence at issue admissible under Rule 404(b), it was still required by Rule 403 to
consider whether its probative value on the issue of motive, opportunity and
intent was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In this
sense Rule 403 is an ultimate filter through which all otherwise admissible evi-
dence must fall. 7
Mack illustrates what the court has labeled an "exception to the general rule."
That exception occurs in cases in which the offense charged and the 404(b) evi-
dence offered are so connected as to constitute one transaction. The Mack Court,
however, appears to have maintained its position that bad acts evidence must still
satisfy Rules 403 and 404(b) prior to its being allowed. Curiously, in deciding
this issue in Mack, the court made no reference to Watts. The Mack Court con-
cluded that because of the close connection of a specific monetary objective, and
because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, error in admitting the evidence,
if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 8
One troublesome portion of the Mack case is the court's discussion of Arizona
v. Bojorquez,39 concerning Arizona's recognized "exception where other bad acts
'complete the story' of the offense."40 The Bojorquez Court found that the evi-
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting West v. State, 463 So. 2d 1051 (Miss. 1985)).
37. Id. (quoting Ford v. State, 555 So. 2d 691, 693 (Miss. 1989)).
38. Mack, 650 So. 2d at 1313.
39. 729 P.2d 965 (Ariz. App. 1986).
40. Id. at 967.
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dence did not complete the story, and that its only purpose could be to prejudice
the jury." Thus, Rule 404(b) can be viewed as creating an exception to the ban
on character evidence when other crimes, wrongs, or acts are offered for a rele-
vant purpose other than propensity. 2
The Mississippi Supreme Court rendered a decision under similar circum-
stances in the case of Snelson v. State.' The state was permitted to offer evi-
dence of the fact that the defendant, Snelson, had purchased and smoked crack
cocaine after he committed the alleged crime." The argued justification was that
it was part of the res gestae, which showed the mood of the defendant at the
time.4" The court reversed and held that the evidence was irrelevant and consti-
tuted reversible error.
4
IV Smith v. State AND ITS PROGENY
The Mississippi Supreme Court clarified and expanded the application of
Rules 403 and 404(b) in the case of Smith v. State.47 The Smith Court affirmed a
drug related conviction because of the defendant's failure to request a limiting
instruction, but ruled that in the future, "wherever 404(b) evidence is offered and
there is an objection which is overruled, the objection shall be deemed an invoca-
tion of the right to a Mississippi RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 balancing analysis and a
limiting instruction."' As a result of Smith, trial courts, on objection, are now
required to conduct a MississiPPi RULE OF EVIDENCE ("MRE") balancing analysis
and, if the evidence is found to satisfy the Rule 403 and 404(b) provisions, a lim-
iting instruction must be given unless the party objecting to the evidence objects
to the giving of the instruction. 9
In reaching its decision, the Smith Court relied, in part, on the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals case of United States v. Davis,"t wherein the propriety of a lim-
iting instruction was recognized in situations allowing this type of evidence in
federal cases under Rule 404(b)."1 The Smith holding was re-affirmed in the case
of Bounds v. State," in which the following was decided:
41. Id.
42. State v. Hughes, 938 P.2d 457, 463 (Ariz. 1997).
43. 704 So. 2d452 (Miss. 1997).
44. Id. at 454.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 455.
47. 656 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 1995).
48. Id. at 100.
49. Notwithstanding Mississippi RuLES OF EVIDENCE 105, the Smith Court prospectively placed the burden
on the trial judge to charge the jury with a limiting instruction, unless objected to by the party entering the
protest to the evidence. RuLE 105 states:
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to
another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence
to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. (emphasis added)
50. 15 E3d 526 (6th Cir. 1994) (evidence of prior drug sales found admissible).
51. The district court found that evidence of Davis' 30 to 40 prior crack sales was admissible under FED. R.
EVID. 404(B) on the issue of intent to distribute, knowledge, and the absence of mistake, and further found that
the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect under FED. R. EVID. 403. Interestingly, in
Davis, the defendant requested that the district court grant a limiting instruction to the jury. Davis, 15 E3d at
530.
52. 688 So. 2d 1362 (Miss. 1997).
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It was not until the recent decision by this Court in Smith v. State, 656 So. 2d
95, 100 (Miss. 1995), that a trial judge was required to give a limiting instruc-
tion sua sponte. There the Court analogized the 404(b) situation to impeach-
ment by prior conviction under MRE 609, where it was suggested that a limiting
instruction be given in order to minimize the risk that the jury will infer guilt
from previous conduct. Id. Going further, the Court looked to federal cases
that allowed character evidence under MRE 404(b) which recognized the neces-
sity of a limiting instruction. See e.g. United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526 (6th
Cir. 1994). However, in the Smith case , this Court failed to reverse because of
the language in MRE 105, dealing specifically with restrictive or limiting
instructions where it states such instructions should be given upon request, and
in the absence of a request, there is not error. It was the Court's decision that in
the future whenever 404(b) evidence is offered, and there is an objection which
is overruled, the objection shall be deemed an invocation of the right to a MRE
403 analysis and a limiting instruction.
Because the case sub judice was heard prior to the definitive ruling regarding
limiting instructions in Smith, the trial judge was not bound by its holding.
Thus, standing alone, it was not reversible error for the trial judge to not give,
sua sponte, a limiting instruction on the MRE 404(b) evidence. The defense
attorney had the burden of objecting contemporaneously and requesting the lim-
iting instruction. However as this case is to be retried, any retrial should be
conducted according to and within the guidelines of Smith.1
3
Since Smith, and notwithstanding the general inadmissibility of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts evidence, the Mississippi Supreme Court has continued to
uphold criminal convictions in cases in which damaging other crimes, wrongs, or
acts evidence has been admitted at the trial level, and in which the Smith holding
has been followed. 4
A significant application of Smith is found in the recently reported case of
Givens v. State,5" that provides an example of the offering of bad acts evidence,
objection thereto, and the failure of the trial judge to, sua sponte, give a limiting
53. Id. at 1371-72 (emphasis added).
54. In Hunt v. State, 687 So. 2d 1154, 1163 (Miss. 1996), the court found that bad acts such as adultery
could be admissible to prove motive, provided however, that the affairs are not proven as mere suspicions, that
they took place at a time relevant to the offense charged, and they involved people related to the crime. Hunt's
admitted ongoing adulterous affair with another person not involved with the victim's death, and her stating that
she would like to see her husband dead, rendered the other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence admissible at trial.
But see Lester v. State, 692 So. 2d 755, 775-76 (Miss. 1997), rev d on other grounds; Weatherspoon v. State 732
so. 2d 158 (Miss. 1999), wherein the court decided the question of the admissibility of evidence of a capital
murder committed during the course of abuse that continued over a several month period. The court found that
the evidence of felonious abuse on or about the date of death was substantial, so the remoteness of the episodic
abuse prior to the date of death cannot be said to have prejudiced Lester at trial. The court concluded that all
acts of episodic child abuse should be admissible as evidence of capital murder committed while engaged in
felonious child abuse; Houston v. State, 531 So. 2d 598, 606 (Miss. 1988). Underwood v. State, 708 So. 2d 18,
32 (Miss. 1998), is an example of the court affirming a conviction on the allowance of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts evidence at the trial level, where the acts offered to be proved are so interrelated as to constitute a single
transaction or occurrence, or a closely related series of transactions or occurrences. The evidence was rendered
admissible due to its being necessary in order to tell the complete story so as not to confuse the jury.
55. 730 So. 2d 81 (Miss. App. 1998).
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instruction pursuant to Smith. The Mississippi Court of Appeals ruled that the
failure to grant a limiting instruction was in error, but held that it was harmless
error."s In upholding the conviction, the court of appeals relied on the case of
Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson v. Jacquith,s7 that set forth the distinction
between harmless and reversible error:
To warrant reversal, two elements must be shown: error, and injury to the party
appealing. Error is harmless when it is trivial, formal, or merely academic, and
not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and where it in
no way affects the final outcome of the case; it is prejudicial, and ground for
reversal, only when it affects the final result of the case and works adversely to a
substantial right of the party assigning it. Obviously, in order for the rule of
harmless error to be called into play in support of a judgment, the judgment
must be otherwise supportable, and will be reversed when there is nothing in the
pleadings or evidence to support it .... 58
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court meant literally what it has
said in Smith and Bounds, concerning a defendant's right to a limiting instruction
unless objected to.
Two recent Mississippi Supreme Court cases restate the holding in Smith and
Bounds. The cases of Knowles v. State9 and Davis v. State0 clearly indicate the
court's intention to require the granting of limiting instructions upon allowing
bad acts evidence at trial. The Knowles court stated:
[the] evidence of Knowles' conduct prior to the effective date of the amended
statute is admissible to prove wilfulness, under Rules 401 and 402 and 404(b) of
the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. However, the trial court must give a limiting
instruction to the jury that the evidence cannot be considered for the conduct
itself, but solely on the issue of Knowles' wilfulness or lack thereof if an objec-
tion to the evidence is made ......
The Givens holding creates an issue that warrants review by the Mississippi
Supreme Court. The appellate court's decision to conduct a case-specific harm-
less error analysis versus the favoring of a sua sponte grant of a limiting instruc-
tion, whenever bad acts evidence is allowed, presents a troublesome issue which
should be resolved.
56. Id. at 93. But see Watts v. State, 635 So. 2d 1364, 1368-69 (here the court appears to state that the fail-
ure of a trial court to grant a proper limiting instruction following the allowance of bad acts evidence could
never be harmless error.).
57. 224 So. 2d 216 (Miss. 1969). See also Moss v. State, 727 So. 2d 720 (Miss. App. 1998) (The appellate
court found that judge's failure to give a limiting instruction sua sponte on the admission of bad acts evidence
not reversible error, and further opined that "neither Smith or any other case on point that had this type of error
held that this oversight is not subject to harmless error analysis").
58. Jacquith, 224 So. 2d at 221.
59. 708 So. 2d 549 (Miss. 1998).
60. 722 So. 2d 143 (Miss. 1998).
61. Knowles, 708 So.2d at 557 (citing Bounds v. State, 688 So. 2d 1362, 1373 (Miss. 1999) ("The mere
objection is deemed to be an implied request for a limiting instruction")).
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The most recent Mississippi Supreme Court pronouncement of Rule 403 and
404(b) applicability is found in the case of Harris v. State,62 concerning the con-
viction of Harris and his co-defendant of conspiracy to sell cocaine. The testi-
mony of a state witness to prior criminal acts committed by the defendants was
ruled admissible, and the court found that no prejudicial/probative balancing
analysis was required under the rules of evidence because the testimony was evi-
dence of the conspiracy itself-not evidence of past bad acts as contemplated
under Rule 404. It is noteworthy that the Harris trial judge charged the jury with
a limiting instruction sufficient to limit the jury's consideration to only those
events relevant to the indicted charge. The court looked upon the trial judge's
procedures favorably and affirmed both convictions.' Thus, it appears that the
Mississippi Supreme Court favors the granting of limiting instructions any time
bad acts evidence is allowed, even if such evidence is found to relate to matters
outside the umbrella of Rules 403 and 404.
V FEDERAL CASE LAW
Subsequent to United States v. Davis,64 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ren-
dered relevant and informative decisions in the cases of United States v.
Johnson"s and United States v. Merriweather.6 s Both cases contain meaningful
discussions as to the proper application of Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence when bad acts evidence has been offered at trial.
Johnson involved a defendant who was convicted of possession of cocaine with
the intent to distribute, and other acts of possession with intent to distribute were
allowed as evidence at trial." The court recognized the fact that the jury, on
hearing that Johnson had on earlier occasions committed essentially the same
offenses for which he was on trial, would have been prejudiced.6 In addressing
the probative value versus any unfair prejudicial effect, the court stated:
Although the balancing of probative value and substantial prejudice may be
"subsumed in the court's ruling admitting the evidence," it is because prior acts
evidence carries with it such a high risk of confusion and misuse that there is a
heightened need for the careful application of the principles set out in Rule 403.
In this case, the district court did not make an explicit finding on the probative
value versus prejudicial effect of the evidence. The court gave the jury three
separate and inconsistent instructions on the purposes for which the prior acts
could be considered. The court first instructed the jury that the prior bad acts
evidence was "admissible for some purpose, perhaps to show motive of some
other relevant activity"; it later instructed that the evidence was admissible as
62. Harris v. State, 712 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 1998)
63. Id. at 725.
64. 15 E3d 526 (6th Cir. 1994).
65. 27 E3d 1186 (6th Cir. 1994).
66. 78 F.3d 1070 (6th Cir. 1996).
67. Johnson, 27 E3d at 1189.
68. Id. at 1193.
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"proof as to method of operations"; and still later stated that the evidence was
admissible to show "intent to commit the crime charged or as evidence of prepa-
ration, plan and knowledge in the commission of the crime charged." 69
The Johnson Court reluctantly affirmed the conviction and admittedly was
troubled in so doing.7" The basis of the court's affirming was threefold. First, the
district court's instructions included sufficient reference to the proper purposes
for which prior bad acts evidence may be used. Second, Johnson's counsel failed
to object to the instructions once the evidence was ruled admissible. Lastly, the
evidence of guilt was found to be so overwhelming that the imprecise instruc-
tions did not contaminate the verdict or result in a miscarriage of justice.71 The
final reason is the functional equivalent of a finding of harmless error that is
consistent with the rationale employed by the Mississippi Court of Appeals in
Givens.72
Thus, Johnson stands for the proposition that there is a problematic trend in
which trial courts readily admit, and appellate courts readily approve, bad acts
evidence without any clear articulation of the specific reasons justifying admis-
sion. The great potential of resulting unfair prejudice to defendants, as it con-
cerns the allowance of bad acts evidence, necessitates a very serious considera-
tion of the proper application of Rule 403 in any weighing and balancing analysis
conducted by trial courts.
United States v. Merriweather73 contains an excellent analysis of the interplay
and proper application of FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 403 and 404(b) in the bad
acts scenario at the trial level. Merriweather was convicted of conspiracy to dis-
tribute cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.74 The
Merriweather Court reversed the convictions due to an abuse of discretion by the
trial court in its allowance of bad acts evidence at trial.75 The court clearly stat-
ed the following pertaining to Rule 404(b):
We undertake, once more, to explain how Rule 404(b) is properly applied:
Upon objection by the defendant, the proponent of the evidence, usually the
government, should be required to identify the specific purpose or purposes for
which the government offers the evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts."
By so requiring, we do not mandate hypertechnicality. It is true that whether
404(b) evidence is admissible for a particular purpose will sometimes be
unclear until late in the trial because whether a fact is "in issue" often depends
on the defendant's theory and the proofs as they develop. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment's purpose in introducing the evidence must be to prove a fact that the
defendant has placed, or conceivably will place, in issue, or a fact that the statu-
tory elements obligate the government to prove.
69. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 1194.
71. Id.
72. Givens v. State, 730 So. 2d 81 (Miss. App. 1998). Note: The Sixth Circuit does not require a sua
sponte granting of a limiting instruction. In Davis, the defendant requested a cautionary instruction.
73. 78 E3d 1070 (6th Cir. 1996).
74. Id. at 1073.
75. Id. at 1073-79.
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After requiring the proponent to identify the specific purpose for which the evi-
dence is offered, the district court must determine whether the identified pur-
pose, whether to prove motive or intent or to identify some other purpose is
"material"; that is, whether it is "in issue" in the case. If the court finds it is, the
court must then determine, before admitting the other acts evidence, whether the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice under Rule 403. If the evidence satisfies Rule 403, then, after
receiving the evidence, the district court must "clearly, simply, and correctly"
instruct the jury as to the specific purpose for which they may consider the evi-
dence. 6
The court found that the district court's instructions to the jury were fatally
flawed." Error was found in the instruction to the jury providing that taped con-
versations were admissible to prove opportunity, preparation, plan, knowledge, or
absence of mistake, as none of the exceptions were in issue in the case.78 The
Merriweather Court further stated:
Among the litany of purposes for admitting the evidence mentioned in the
court's instructions, which were anything but "limiting," only "identity" and
"intent" were arguably proper purposes.
79
There remains, however, the question whether the proper application of Rule
403's balancing requirement-a balancing the court appears not to have under-
taken-precludes admitting the Jones conversations to prove identity. One fac-
tor in balancing unfair prejudice against probative value under Rule 403 is the
availability of other means of proof Playing the Jones tapes to prove that the
voice on the Bender tape belonged to Merriweather was the most unfairly preju-
dicial means of proving [Merriweather's identity on the Bender tape.] There
were other means to prove Merriweather 's identity on the Bender tape. Indeed,
the government had already employed the most direct method: Ahmad,
Merriweather's cousin, identified Merriweather's voice on the Bender tape.
Ahmad could have identified Merriweather's voice on nonincriminating por-
tions of the Jones tape; then the jury could have compared that voice to the one
on the Bender tape."
It is suggested that Merriweather is an excellent reference point for a clear
understanding of the procedures to be followed when applying Rules 403 and
404(b) to other crimes, wrongs, or acts situations arising at the trial level. The
case is fairly consistent with cases of other jurisdictions, as well as those within
the State of Mississippi, and it exemplifies a sound procedural outline for the
76. Id. at 1076-77 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 1077.
78. Id. But see Ford v. State, 555 So. 2d 691 (Miss. 1989) (In Ford, a similar instruction was given and
approved by the Mississippi Supreme Court.).
79. Merriweather, 78 E3d at 1077.
80. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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ensuring of fundamental fairness for both sides of the criminal controversy. 1
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit is in accord with the views set forth in Merriweather
as they concern the admissibility and procedural practices commensurate with
allowing any such evidence. s2
VI. CONCLUSION
Although not intended to include every relevant Mississippi case on the subject
of Rules 403 and 404 of the MississiPPi RULES OF EVIDENCE, it is hoped that the
discussion on the cited authorities result in a better and more workable under-
standing of the operation and application of the rules in the trial court environ-
ment. It is clear that Rules 403 and 404 have undergone a continuous fine-tun-
ing process whereby it is now evident that favorable procedural practices have
emerged in the overall criminal court system, be it state or federal.
The authorities cited here clearly characterize the weighing and balancing
process of Rule 403 as being of a most serious nature because other crimes,
wrongs, or acts evidence, if allowed, have such a potentially prejudicial effect on
the opponent of the evidence. It is equally evident that any limiting instruction
embodying a shotgun approach, including all of the listed 404(b) exceptions,
would be an inappropriate jury charge, and would be highly susceptible to a find-
ing of an abuse of discretion on the part of a trial judge by an appellate court.
As has been seen in the cited authorities, bad acts evidence must satisfy one or
more of the listed exceptions in 404(b), and additionally, the offered evidence
must be material to an issue in the proceeding. Further, and pursuant to the
Merriweather rationale, it is submitted that if the proponent of the bad acts evi-
dence has other, less prejudicial means of establishing the offered purpose of the
evidence, then the offered evidence should not be received by the trial court.
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence is an area of evidence that surfaces in
criminal trials with virtually unequaled frequency. When offered, its effect is
damaging. There can be no doubt that the proponent of the evidence fully
intends it to be so. Thus, it is critical for trial counsel to be aware of the spirit of
Rules 403 and 404, and the proper procedural methods for dealing with such
instances when they occur. For obvious reasons, the better practice would be to
deal correctly with 403/404 situations at the trial level when they arise, rather
than be left with only the hope of a favorable ruling from an appellate court on
review resulting from of an adverse holding in the trial court. The importance
and coverage of limiting instructions is an area that equally necessitates an
informed working knowledge of the operation of the rules. Timely objections to
offered bad acts evidence, the granting of a limiting instruction, and the overall
weight of the evidence in any given case are important factors to be considered
in evaluating the appropriateness of trial court rulings. This is especially true,
81. Merriweather also justifies a limiting of the Hoops instruction, discussed infra, to only the real justifi-
cation for admission rather than the whole litany.
82. See United States v. Bailey, 111 E3d 1229 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Townsend, 31 F.3d 262 (5th
Cir. 1994); United States v. West, 22 E3d 586 (5th Cir. 1994).
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given the fact that a trial court's failure to fully comply with the provisions of
Rules 403 and 404 could very well be overshadowed by appellate review result-
ing in a finding of harmless error.
Rules 403 and 404 of the MississiPPi RULES OF EVIDENCE provide attorneys
with a spirited challenge which can be met only by achieving a full understand-
ing of the mandate of the courts rendering opinions that touch on bad acts evi-
dence. While some issues remain to be resolved by the appellate courts in the
area of bad acts evidence, the current status appears to be heading toward estab-
lishing of a consistent and workable approach to finally determine the correct
methods of dealing with other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence arising in any
particular case. In the final analysis, it is the attorney's responsibility to be thor-
oughly familiar with the procedural operation of Rules 403 and 404, and the
authorities setting forth the correct methods when confronted with such prob-
lems occurring during the course of a proceeding. The good news is that the pre-
sent state of Rules 403 and 404 practice has not closed the door on creativity or
imagination.
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